By Michael Wolffsohn
A commentary analysis
Can Jews form a state? Oh yes – and yet, in Israel's seventy-fifth anniversary year, doubts are more warranted than ever. No doubt about it: what Israel's society, culture, science, economy, legal system, military, and even politics have accomplished in this historically measured, minuscule period in world and Jewish history borders on the miraculous. Seventy-five years ago a developing country, today highly developed, in some areas a world leader.
Anniversary-related reflections tend to be one-dimensional, focusing on celebration and the individual. More important are the general, the multifaceted, and the contradictory. Seventy-five years of Israel, not least, document the enormous problems of integration, distribution, and procedure that even any seemingly consensual or seemingly homogeneous society faces. The bitter, almost hateful struggle over the essence of democracy is also anything but uniquely Israeli. Specifically: Is the minority that loses in democratic elections prepared to accept the result in all its consequences, including the loss of power and, consequently, distribution?
It wasn't the right-wing religious Netanyahu camp during the liberal Benet/Lapid interregnum of 2021/22. They sabotaged the process with virtually every conceivable parliamentary trick. The anti-Netanyahu camp, more center-left, mobilized the masses until 2021 and has been activating them primarily outside of parliament since the end of 2022. Furthermore, the intellectual and political debate surrounding the weight of the judiciary in the theory and practice of the separation of powers is by no means uniquely Israeli or even new. It dates back to the 18th century. See Montesquieu or the American "Federalist Papers.".
The Jewish world – divided since time immemorial
Israel, like the Jewish world, has always been divided. Even the biblically presented Jewish unity of the Davidic kingdom lasted only until the death of his son Solomon (circa 930 BCE). Afterwards, the two Jewish kingdoms of "Judea" and "Israel" waged war against each other during the First Temple period (c. 950–586 BCE). Today, as since 721 BCE (the Assyrian exile), the most obvious division is that between Zion and the Diaspora. As now, more Jews live in the Diaspora. Neither in Zion (Israel) nor in the Diaspora has there ever been, nor is there now, a united front of "the" Jews. It exists only as a figment of the imagination of those who oppose Jews. Fundamental internal Jewish tensions and divisions existed even during the Second Temple period (518 BCE – 70 CE). This has been no different in the two thousand years of diaspora since the loss of Jewish statehood in 70 CE.
Intra-Jewish conflicts and wars have always been both a curse and a blessing in Jewish world history. A curse because of self-destruction. A blessing because all actors have always had to utilize and develop their full potential in order to survive or prevail, both internally and externally. For three thousand years, antisemitism and intra-Jewish conflicts, including violent ones, have been the high price that "the" Jews and "the" Israelis have paid since 1948 for their enormous scientific, economic, cultural, and, consequently, military successes.
But isn't every pluralistic society also divided? Even the almost homogenous Eastern and partly Central European (Ashkenazi) "founding aristocracy," the first Israel, was deeply divided among itself. For the Zionist veterans—even more so for the left than for the right—the Oriental Jews who had been streaming into the country since 1948 were merely "second-class Jews." Firstly, because they were Orientals, and secondly, because, unlike the vast majority of the founding aristocracy, they were and are religious or even Orthodox. Unlike then, since the first electoral victory of Likud and religious Jews under Menachem Begin in 1977, Oriental Jews plus religious Jews have been a majority, not a minority—despite the arrival of approximately one million Ashkenazi immigrants from the former Soviet Union since 1974/1990. The Oriental and religious Jewish Jews, in fact, have even larger families than the Ashkenazim, who are also quite prolific.
The governing coalition – a reflection of demographics
The Second Israel now plays the leading role. The new Netanyahu coalition is therefore a reflection of Israel's demographics and sociology, and Likud is the only personal and ideological bridge between parts of the First and Second Israel. In 2020/21 and especially in 2023, the First Israel, which had suffered repeated electoral defeats, attempted to reclaim "its Israel" through mass demonstrations. Diaspora Jews and Western non-Jews find this appealing, but it is nostalgic. It is also historically ironic. Politics was thereby shifted from the institutions to the streets—specifically, from the very institutions that the First Israel had created. Even with the best democratic intentions, however, every de-institutionalization develops a dynamic of its own that is dangerous for democracy.
Because oil and natural gas remain indispensable, they are worth their weight in gold, and the Islamic Middle East—long before Israel's founding—has been geostrategically significant and therefore contested. Israel exists as the only non-Islamic state in this geostrategically crucial Middle East. From the outset, the Jewish state was therefore a disruptive factor for all states that needed the Islamic Middle East as a strategic partner in any vital area. A Jewish state of its own, a safe haven, a lifeline, according to the axiom of Zionism, would end two thousand years of horror. This was a mistake. Israel's survival remained precarious. In the age of decolonization and postcolonialism after 1945, some believe Israel owes its independence to the mercy of the British colonial powers.
Yes, in 1917/20 the British colonial power promised the Zionists a "homeland" (not a state!) in Palestine. They broke that promise. As a result, the Zionist movement began its anti-colonial struggle in 1944/46. They won in 1948 – only to immediately have to fight for survival in the Islamic world. Part 1 of the tragedy. Part 2: The Palestinians have always claimed the same territory. That's why they escalated their war against the Zionists in 1947/48. They lost and called on their Arab brothers for help. They came, lost – but took, or rather, illegally occupied, the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Jordan) as well as the Gaza Strip (Egypt). In 1967, in the Six-Day War, they lost these parts of Palestine to Israel. Now Israel became the occupying power there.
"Land for peace." Israel offered this immediately in 1967. Three times no, was the response from the Arab League. Also in 1967. In the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula—and achieved peace. In 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon, which it had occupied in 1978. Peace? Rocket terror. In 2005, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip. Since then, more rocket terror. From this, the majority of Israelis drew this lesson regarding the West Bank: If there can be no peace for land, then it's better to keep and settle the (West Bank) land. The Palestinians' reaction is emotionally understandable: anger, despair, and terror as weapons of the conventionally weaker party. Rationally counterproductive, because the conventionally stronger party, Israel, reacts in turn: with superior force and political-ideological hardening. This is evident in election results and coalitions. A completely new role for "the" Jews in world history. David, powerless because he was stateless, became a Goliath in his own country, and giants are rarely sympathetic figures.
Power through knowledge
What turned little David into Goliath? Knowledge. Knowledge is power, and for some 2,500 years, the transmission of knowledge—first rooted in personal and familial connections, then institutionally—has been a central component, value, word, and deed in the Jewish world. The same is true in Israel. The scientific, economic, cultural, and security-related achievements that Israel has attained in 75 years can be traced back to the pan-Jewish educational tradition. Now, even its less academically gifted Arab neighbors want to benefit from these achievements and are therefore normalizing their relations with Israel. They continue their pro-Palestinian lip service but are guided by their own national interests. Consequently, the Palestinians themselves are a disruptive force in regional and global politics.
The Jewish state – unpopular, yet needed
Israel's innovative scientific, economic, and highly effective security capabilities are in greater demand than ever, particularly in areas where such deficiencies exist. This is especially true in Western Europe, particularly Germany. Here, the Jewish new Goliath is highly unpopular – but it is needed. We recognize in this new situation the old, historical pattern of Jewish history: when Jews or Israelis are needed, they are treated with care.
Where does the fundamental unpopularity of the Jewish state stem from, particularly in Western Europe? Four key points. Unlike in Western Europe, Jewish Israelis, after two thousand years without a state, revere their state almost iconically. Secondly, for them, the state territory as a country has an ideological and material existential significance, both for this reason and for military ones. At least until Putin's war in Ukraine, Western Europeans associated land as a political factor more readily with the Nazi "blood and soil" ideology. Thirdly, Western Europeans are suspicious of the nationalistic "we" of Jews and Israelis. Fourthly, the majority of Western Europeans, who are not religious (and not only towards Jews), find it difficult to accept religion as a political factor. Even before the current Israeli nightmare coalition, approximately ten percent of naturalized Israelis lived abroad, primarily in the USA and increasingly in Germany. The Muslim newcomers to Europe have brought their traditional anti-Judaism and anti-Israelism with them. They are strengthening Europe's enemies of Jews and Israel from both the right and the left.
This now three-tiered, rather than two-tiered, anti-Jewish alliance means danger for Diaspora Jews. The alternative? Israel. What does the future hold for Israel? First, the multifaceted division of Israel is causing a significant exodus of the predominantly Ashkenazi, secular, and economic elite. But the rising antisemitism in Europe, including the USA, with its anti-Zionist variant, threatens both the old and new Ashkenazi Diaspora Jewish community. Not a new Holocaust, but an ideological and existential catastrophe nonetheless. Therefore, a new exodus: the return of the Ashkenazim to an even more oriental and religious Israel – provided it still exists despite a soon-to-be nuclear-armed Iran.
This article is an excerpt from Michael Wolffsohn's keynote address at the CSI anniversary conference in Neu-Ulm at the end of March. A more detailed version of the article appeared in the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" (NZZ). Historian Prof. Dr. Michael Wolffsohn is the author of, among other works, the books "Eine andere Jüdische Weltgeschichte" (2022) and "Ewige Schuld?" (2023).
This article first appeared in our newspaper "Israelaktuell," issue 133. You can order the newspaper free of charge here. We would also be happy to send you several copies for distribution.
